Abstract. LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin [15] proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model and an AKE protocol, called NAXOS. Unlike previous security models, the adversary in the eCK model is allowed to obtain ephemeral secret information related to the test session, which makes the security proof difficult. To overcome this NAXOS combines an ephemeral private key x with a static private key a to generate an ephemeral public key X; more precisely X = g H(x,a) . As a result, no one is able to query the discrete logarithm of X without knowing both the ephemeral and static private keys. In other words, the discrete logarithm of an ephemeral public key, which is typically the ephemeral secret, is hidden via an additional random oracle. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct eCK-secure protocol without the NAXOS' approach by proposing two eCK-secure protocols. One is secure under the GDH assumption and the other under the CDH assumption; their efficiency and security assurances are comparable to the well-known HMQV [12] protocol. Furthermore, they are at least as secure as protocols that use the NAXOS' approach but unlike them and HMQV, the use of the random oracle is minimized and restricted to the key derivation function.
Introduction
Using key exchange two parties can establish a common secret, called a session key, via a public communication channel. Diffie and Hellman [10] proposed the first key exchange protocol in which two parties exchange X = g x , Y = g y and derive a session key from g xy = Y x = X y . The original Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol does not provide authentication and is vulnerable to active personin-the-middle attacks. A key exchange protocol is authenticated key exchange (AKE) if both parties are assured that only their intended peers can derive the session key.
Bellare and Rogaway [5] proposed the first security model and definition for authenticated key exchange that allows a rigorous analysis. Their model is indistinguishability based, where an adversary is required to differentiate between a random key and a session key. There have been several variations to the BellareRogaway model and until recently, the Canetti-Krawczyk [8] (CK) model was regarded as one of the most significant BR modifications.
The CK model, however, fails to capture some desirable AKE properties. CK-secure protocols may still be vulnerable to key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack or may not be resilient to the leakage of ephemeral private keys (LEP). Resilience to LEP is motivated by scenarios where the session specific information is stored in an insecure place or the random number generator used by a party is corrupt.
To bring these attacks and properties within the scope of analysis, LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin changed the CK model, to the so called eCK model, and proposed NAXOS as an example of an eCK-secure protocol. Informally, the eCK aims to allow all adversary queries, except those that trivially break AKE protocols. In particular the eCK adversary is allowed to obtain ephemeral secret information related to the test session, which makes the security arguments in the eCK model difficult. To achieve eCK security, NAXOS requires that the ephemeral public key X be computed from an exponent made up by hashing an ephemeral private key x and the static private key a, more precisely, X = g H(x,a) instead of X = g x . In this paper generating ephemeral public key as X = g
is called NAXOS' approach. In NAXOS' approach no one is able to query the discrete logarithm of an ephemeral public key X without the pair (x, a); thus the discrete logarithm of X is hidden via an extra random oracle. Using NAXOS' approach many protocols [25, 11, 16, 17] were argued secure in the eCK model under the random oracle assumption. In the standard model, the only (to our knowledge) eCK-secure protocol is due to Okamoto [22] ; it uses pseudo-random functions instead of hash functions.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct eCK-secure AKE protocols without NAXOS' approach by giving two example protocols. Protocol 1 relies on the Gap Diffie-Hellman and the random oracle assumptions. Protocol 2 is derived by applying the trapdoor technique introduced by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup [9] to Protocol 1, and thus uses Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption instead of the gap assumption.
Our protocols provide no less security assurances than protocols utilizing the NAXOS' approach in the sense that our analysis considers leakage of the discrete logarithm of ephemeral public keys. One advantage of this method (see [26] ) is to reduce the risk of leaking the static private key, since the derivation of the ephemeral public key is independent from the static private key. This is in contrast to protocols that use the NAXOS' approach. In addition, unlike other eCK secure protocols and HMQV, which require at least two random oracles, we minimize the use of the random oracle, by applying it only to the session key derivation.
Organization. In section 2, we recall the security assumptions and the trapdoor test, which we use in this paper. In section 3, we briefly outline the eCK model and then propose our new protocols with security arguments in sections 4 and 5. In section 6 we compare our protocols with other relevant protocols and conclude in section 7.
Preliminaries
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q and generator g. Let dl g : G → Z q be the discrete logarithm (DL) function which takes an input X ∈ G and returns x ∈ Z q such that X = g x . Define the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) function dh g :
, and the corresponding decisional predicate ddh g : G 3 → {0, 1} as a function which takes an input (X, Y, Z) ∈ G 3 and returns 1 if Z = dh g (X, Y ) and 0 otherwise. The advantage of an algorithm S in solving the CDH problem, Adv CDH (S), is the probability that, given input X, Y selected uniformly at random from G, S returns dh g (X, Y ). Similarly, the advantage of an algorithm S in solving the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem, Adv GDH (S), is the probability that, given input X, Y selected uniformly at random in G and oracle access to ddh g ( · , · , · ), S returns dh g (X, Y ).
We say that G satisfy the CDH (resp. GDH) assumption if no probabilistic polynomial-time bounded algorithm can solve the CDH (resp. GDH) problem on G with non-negligible advantage.
In the security argument of Protocol 2 we will use the following theorem, called the trapdoor test, (see [9] for theorem details).
Theorem 1 (Trapdoor Test in [9] ). Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q, generated by g ∈ G. Suppose X 1 , r, s are mutually independent random variables, where X 1 takes values in G, and each of r, s is uniformly distributed over Z q , and define the random variable X 2 := g s /X r 1 . Further, suppose thatŶ ,Ẑ 1 ,Ẑ 2 are random variables taking values in G, each of which is defined as some function of X 1 and X 2 . Then we have:
1. X 2 is uniformly distributed over G; 2. X 1 and X 2 are independent; 3. if X 1 = g x1 and X 2 = g x2 , then the probability that the truth value of
does not agree with the truth value of
is at most 1/q; moreover, if (2) holds, then (1) certainly holds.
For further eCK details and explanations see [15] . In the eCK model, each party is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine and is assigned a static public and private key pair together with a certificate that binds party's identity to its public key. We denote a party's identity A, B, C, . . . 3 . We assume that, the certificate authority (CA) does not require proof of possession of the corresponding private key included in a certificate. However, CA verifies that the public key is in G × = G − {id G }, where id G is the identity element of G.
We outline the eCK model for two-pass Diffie-Hellman protocols, where two parties A and B exchange static and ephemeral public keys and thereafter compute a session key that depends on the exchanged public keys and identities of the parties.
Session. An invocation of a protocol is called a session. Session activation is made via an incoming message of the forms (I, A, B) or (R, A, B, Y ). If A was activated with (I, A, B), then A is called the session initiator, otherwise it is called the session responder. After activation, session initiator A creates ephemeral public key X and sends (R, B, A, X) to the session responder B, who then prepares ephemeral public key Y , computes the session key and sends (I, A, B, X, Y ) to A. Upon receiving (I, A, B, X, Y ), A also computes a session key for the session A owns. We say that a session is completed if its owner computes a session key.
If A is the initiator of a session, the session is identified via (I, A, B, X, ×) or (I, A, B, X, Y ). For a responder A the session is identified via (R, A, B, Y, X). The matching session of (I, A, B, X, Y ) is a session with identifier (R, B, A, X, Y ) and vice versa. In the remainder of the paper we will omit I and R since these "role markers" are implicitly defined from the order of ephemeral public keys.
Adversary. The adversary M is modeled as a probabilistic Turing machine that controls all communications including session activation, performed via Send(message) query. The message has one of the following forms: (pid, pid), (pid, pid, X), or (pid, pid, X, Y ), where pid and pid are identities. Each party submits its responses to the adversary, who decides the global delivery order.
The adversary does not have immediate access to a party's private information. However, leakage of private information is captured via the following adversary queries:
-EphemeralKeyReveal(sid) The adversary obtains the ephemeral secret key associated with the session sid.
-SessionKeyReveal(sid) The adversary obtains the session key for the session sid, provided that the session holds a session key.
-StaticKeyReveal(pid) The adversary learns the static secret key of the party pid.
-EstablishParty(pid) 4 This query allows the adversary to register a static public key on behalf of a party pid; the adversary totally controls that party. If a party pid is established by EstablishParty(pid) query issued by adversary, then we call the party dishonest. If not, we call the party honest. This query models malicious insider.
To define eCK security we need the following definition. Security Experiment. Initially, the adversary M is given a set of honest parties, for whom M selects identifiers. Then the adversary makes any sequence of the queries described above. During the experiment, M makes a special query Test(sid * ), where sid * is a fresh session, and is given with equal probability either the session key held by sid * or a random key; the query does not terminate the experiment. The experiment continues until M makes a guess whether the key is random or not. The adversary wins the game if the test session sid * is still fresh and if M guess was correct.
Definition 1 (Freshness
Definition 2 (eCK security). The advantage of the adversary M in the AKE experiment with AKE protocol Π is defined as
We say that an AKE protocol Π is secure in the eCK model if the following conditions hold:
1. If two honest parties complete matching sessions, then, except with negligible probability, they both compute the same session key. 2. For any probabilistic polynomial-time bounded adversary M, Adv
is negligible.
Protocol 1
In sections 4 and 5, we offer two eCK-secure protocols without NAXOS' approach. The following are parameters used in the protocol descriptions.
Parameters. Let k/2 be the security parameter and G be a cyclic group with generator g and order a k-bit prime q. Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k be a cryptographic hash function modeled as a random oracle. Party A's static private key is a pair a 1 , a 2 ∈ Z × q and his public key is the pair
Protocol 1 description
In the description, A is the session initiator and B is the session responder.
1.
A chooses at random an ephemeral private key x ∈ Z × q , computes the ephemeral public key X = g x and sends (B, A, X) to B.
Upon receiving (B,
A, X), B verifies that X ∈ G × . If so, B chooses at random an ephemeral private key y ∈ Z × q and computes the ephemeral public key Y = g y . After computing the shared secrets
y+b2 , the session key SK = H(Z 1 , Z 2 , X, Y, A, B) and sending (A, B, X, Y ) to A, B completes the session with session key SK. Both parties compute the shared secrets
and therefore compute the same session key SK.
Protocol 1 security argument
Theorem 2. If the GDH assumption holds in G and H is a random oracle, then the Protocol 1 is eCK-secure.
Proof. Let M be a polynomially bounded adversary against Protocol 1, that runs in time t(k), activates at most n(k) honest parties, at most s(k) sessions and makes at most h(k) queries to the oracle H, where t(k), n(k), s(k), and h(k) are polynomially bounded in k. Assume also that Adv AKE Protocol 1 (M) is nonnegligible. Since H is modeled as a random oracle, the adversary M has only three ways to distinguish a session key of the test session from a random string.
-A1. Guessing attack: M correctly guesses the session key.
-A2. Key replication attack: M creates a session that is not matching to the test session, but has the same session key as the test session. -A3. Forging attack: M computes Z 1 and Z 2 used in the test session, and queries H with (Z 1 , Z 2 , X, Y, A, B).
Since H is a random oracle, the probability of guessing the output of H is O 1/2 k , which is negligible. Since non-matching sessions have different communicating parties or ephemeral public keys, key replication is equivalent to finding an H-collision; therefore the probability, that event A2 occurs, is O s(k) 2 /2 k , which is also negligible. Thus events A1 and A2 can be ruled out.
Let M be the event that M wins the security game, H be the event that M queries H with (Z 1 , Z 2 , X, Y, A, B), and H the complementary event of H. Since H is a random oracle and events A1 and A2 were ruled out, we have Pr[M|H] = 1 2 except with negligible difference. Then
is also non-negligible. Now, consider the following complementary sub-events of A3.
-E1. A3 occurs and the test session has no matching session. -E2. A3 occurs and the test session has a matching session.
Then
Pr
Consider also the following sub-events of E1 so that E1 = E1 a ∨ E1 b .
-E1 a . E1 occurs and M does not reveal the ephemeral private key of the owner of the test session, but may query for the static private key of the test session owner. -E1 b . E1 occurs and the owner's static private key of the test session has never been revealed by M, but may query for the ephemeral private key of the test session owner.
Consider also the following sub-events of E2 so that
-E2 a . E2 occurs and M does not reveal the ephemeral private keys of both the owner of the test session and its peer, but may query for the static private keys of the test session peers. We then have
We will show how to construct a GDH solver S that uses a Protocol 1 adversary M. The solver S is given a CDH instance (U, V ), where U and V are selected uniform randomly in G, access to a ddh g (· , · , ·) oracle and has to compute dh g (U, V ). Without loss of generality in the analysis, we denote the test session owner and peer by A and B, respectively, and assume that A is the initiator.
Analysis of E1 a . We use M to construct a GDH solver S that succeeds with non-negligible probability provided that event E1 a occurs. S prepares n(k) honest parties, selects one party B to whom S assigns static public key B 1 = V, B 2 = V r , where S randomly chooses r ∈ Z q . The remaining n(k) − 1 parties are assigned random static public and private key pairs. S also chooses a session sid * , owned by an honest party A.
When M activates sessions between honest peers S follows the protocol description. Since S knows static private keys of at least one peer, it can respond all queries faithfully. The only exception is the session sid * , for which S sets the ephemeral public key of sid * to U , and chooses a random ζ ∈ {0, 1} k as the session key of sid * . The simulator has difficulty in responding queries related to B because S does not know the static private key of B. More precisely, for sessions owned by B with peer C controlled by M, S cannot compute shared secrets Z 1 , Z 2 , but may have to answer SessionKeyReveal queries. Note that M can obtain session keys of these session by computing the shared secrets Z 1 , Z 2 and query H. If two values do not coincide, then S fails its simulation. To handle this situations, S prepares R list with entries of the form (pid, pid, W, W , SK) ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * × G 2 × {0, 1} k , which is maintained for consistent responses to H and SessionKeyReveal queries.
We next describe the action of S when M makes queries related to B. In the following, Y is generated by the party B. Recall that if the session identifier is (B, C, X, Y ) (resp. (B, C, Y, X)), then B is the session responder (resp. initiator). -EphemeralKeyReveal(·): S responds to the query faithfully.
-StaticKeyReveal(B) or EstablishParty(B): S aborts.
-Test(sid): If sid = sid * , S aborts. Otherwise, S randomly chooses ζ ∈ {0, 1} k and returns it to the adversary M.
Provided that event E1 a occurs and M selects the session sid * as the test session with peer B, the simulation does not fail; let Y denote the test session incoming ephemeral public key. If M is successful with non-negligible probability it must have queried H with inputsẐ 1 = (Y B 1 )
where x * ≡ dl g (U ) mod q, because S sets the ephemeral public key X * of sid * as U . To solve the CDH instance, S checks if there is an H query made by M of the form (Z 1 , Z 2 , U, Y, A, B) , such that ddh g (U A 1 , Y B 1 , Z 1 ) = 1 and ddh g (U A 2 , Y B 2 , Z 2 ) = 1. If such an H query exists, S computes
Therefore, by computing Z *
With probability at least 1 s(k)n(k) , the test session is sid * with peer B. Thus, the advantage of S is
Analysis of E1 b . S prepares n(k) honest parties, selects two distinct parties, say A and B, and assigns A's and B's static public keys as A 1 = U, A 2 = U s and B 1 = V, B 2 = V r , respectively, where r and s are random elements of Z q . The remaining n(k) − 2 parties are assigned random static and private key pairs. If M activates sessions owned by any honest party except A and B, then S follows the protocol description. The parties A and B are simulated as in the case E1 a .
If M selected the session sid * as the test session with owner A and peer B, this simulation does not fail provided that the event E1 b occurs. If M is successful with non-negligible probability, it must have queried H with inputs of the form 
With probability at least 1 n(k) 2 , M will select a test session with owner and peer A and B, respectively. Thus the advantage of S is
Analysis of E2 a . S prepares n(k) honest parties, and assigns random static public and private key pairs for these parties. S also chooses two session sid * , sid * . Let A be the owner of sid * and B owner of sid * . S sets the ephemeral public key of sid * to be U and of sid * to be V . Hence S's simulation for M can fail only if M issues EphemeralKeyReveal against sid * or sid * . Provided that M selects the session sid * as the test session with owner A and peer B and sid * as its matching session, and event E2 a occurs, then the simulation does not fail. If M is successful with non-negligible probability it must have queried H with 
Analysis of E2 b , E2 c and E2 d . For event E2 b , E2 c , E2 d , S's simulation is similar to E1 b , E1 a , E1 a , respectively. We omit the details and provide only the conclusion:
Combining equations (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) , and (10), the advantage of S is
Since Pr[A3] is non-negligible, from (3), (4), at least one of Pr[E1 a ], · · · , Pr[E2 d ] is non-negligible, and therefore Adv GDH (S) is non-negligible. During the simulation, S performs group exponentiations, queries the DDH oracle, and simulates H. All of these take polynomially bounded time because a group exponentiation takes time O(k) and t(k), n(k), s(k), h(k) are polynomial in k. Therefore, the running time of S is polynomially bounded. Hence, S is a polynomial-time algorithm that solves the GDH problem in G with non-negligible probability, which contradicts the assumed security of GDH problem in G. This completes the argument.
Protocol 2 description
Protocol 2 is similar to Protocol 1 and follows below. The difference between the two protocols is that Protocol 2 computes two additional shared secrets. In the description, A is the session initiator and B session responder.
1.
Upon receiving (B,
A, X), B verifies that X ∈ G × . If so, B chooses at random an ephemeral private key y ∈ Z × q , computes the ephemeral public key Y = g y . After computing the shared secrets 
x+a2 and completes the session sid = (A, B, X, Y ) with session key SK = H(Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 , X, Y, A, B).
Both parties compute the same
Security proof
Theorem 3. If the CDH assumption for G holds and H is a random oracle, then the Protocol 2 is eCK-secure.
Proof. The security proof of Protocol 2 is similar to that of Protocol 1; only the differences are explained here. Let M be a polynomially bounded adversary against Protocol 2, that runs in time t(k), activates at most n(k) honest parties, at most s(k) sessions and makes at most h(k) queries to the oracle H, where t(k), n(k), s(k) and h(k) are polynomially bounded in k. Assume also that M succeeds with non-negligible advantage. As the case of Protocol 1, the adversary has only three ways to distinguish a session key of a test session from a random string: guess, key replication or forging attack. Since H is a random oracle guessing and key replication occur only with negligible probability.
We use the same events and notation as in the security proof of Protocol 1. In event A3, M computes Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 and Z 4 used in the test session and queries H with (Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 , Z 4 , X, Y, A, B). As in the security proof of Protocol 1 we show how to construct a CDH solver S.
In the S's simulations of environment of M, the most important point is to maintain consistency between H and SessionKeyReveal queries when S does not know static private key of the honest party that is activated. Such situations occur when S embeds the CDH instance into the honest party's static public key. So, if M queries H with (Ẑ 1 ,Ẑ 2 ,Ẑ 3 ,Ẑ 4 , X, Y, C, B) or (Ẑ 1 ,Ẑ 2 ,Ẑ 3 ,Ẑ 4 , Y, X, B, C) , then S has to be able to check the correctness ofẐ 1 ,Ẑ 2 ,Ẑ 3 ,Ẑ 4 .
We now explain how S maintains the consistency. Let B be an honest party whose static public key is B 1 = V , B 2 = g s /V r , where s and r are randomly selected from Z q by S. Let C be a party (not necessarily an honest one) whose static public key is C 1 , C 2 . When M queries H with (Ẑ 1 ,Ẑ 2 ,Ẑ 3 ,Ẑ 4 , X, Y, C, B) or (Ẑ 1 ,Ẑ 2 ,Ẑ 3 ,Ẑ 4 , Y, X, B, C), we may assume that there is a session with identifier (B, C, X, Y ) or (B, C, Y, X). Otherwise, it is sufficient for S to return a random string to M. Suppose there is a session with identifier (B, C, X, Y ), since B is honest, Y is generated by S, so dl g (Y ) is known to S, who can computē
The valuesẐ 1 ,Ẑ 2 ,Ẑ 3 ,Ẑ 4 are generated according to the protocol if and only if
. The algorithm S can check ifẐ 1 ,Ẑ 2 ,Ẑ 3 andẐ 4 are generated according to the protocol specifications by verifyinḡ
the verification holds with probability at least 1 − 
s . To complete the security proof, an explanation of how to embed and solve CDH instance in the cases E1 a , E1 b , E2 a , E2 b , E2 c and E2 d is still needed.
E1 a case. Suppose that the test session is (A, B, X, Y ), where A = B, X = U , and party B's static public key is B 1 = V, B 2 = g s /V r with randomly choosen r, s ∈ Z × q . In the event E1 a , the ephemeral public key Y is controlled by M. If M is successful with non-negligible probability, it must have queried H with inputs of the form
. With probability at least
, U is the test session outgoing ephemeral public key and B is the test session peer. Since the probability that some trapdoor test yields an incorrect answer is at most 2h(k)/q, the advantage of S is
E1 b case. Suppose that the test session is (A, B, X, Y ), where A = B and A's static public key is A 1 = U, A 2 = g s /U r and B's static public key is B 1 = V, B 2 = g s /V r with randomly choosen r, s, r , s ∈ Z × q . In the event E1 b , Y is controlled by M, but S selects X and so S knows dl g (X). If M is successful with non-negligible probability, it must have queried H with inputs of the form
With probability at least
2 , the test session peers are A and B, and hence the advantage of S is
E2 a case. Suppose that the test session and its matching sessions are (A, B, X, Y ) and (B, A, X, Y ), respectively, where X = U and Y = V (the case where X = V and Y = U is similar). The simulator S knows the static private key of all honest parties including A and B. If M is successful with non-negligible probability, it must have queried H with inputs of the form
2 , the test session has ephemeral public keys U and V , and hence the advantage of S is
E2 b , E2 c , E2 d cases. For cases E2 b , E2 c and E2 d , the arguments are similar to E1 b , E1 a , and E1 a , respectively; therefore
Adv
Combining equations (11), (12) , (13), (14), (15) , and (16), the advantage of S is
As CDH (S) is non-negligible. Moreover, during the simulation, S performs group exponentiations and simulates H, all of which take polynomially bounded in k time . Thus, the running time of S is bounded by a polynomial in k time. Therefore, S is a polynomial-time algorithm that solves the CDH problem in G with non-negligible advantage, which contradicts the hardness of the CDH problem in G. This concludes the argument. Remark 1. In the security argument of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2, for simplicity we do not allow the test session to be of the form (A, B, X, Y ), where A = B. However, if we allow the session of the form (A, A, X, Y ), then the arguments can be modified to solve the Square computational Diffie-Hellman (SCDH) problem. The SCDH problem is given X ∈ G, compute X dlg(X) 2 . More precisely, in Protocol 1 this case is reduced to solve SCDH problem given DDH oracle, and in Protocol 2 reduced to solve SCDH problem. Also, note that CDH problem is equivalent to SCDH problem in prime order cyclic group G, see [2] .
Comparison
In this section, we compare our protocols with other related PKI-based two-pass AKE protocols in terms of underlying assumption, computational efficiency and security model. In Table 1 number of exponentiation in G, number of static public keys in terms of group elements and number of ephemeral public key in terms of group elements are denoted by E, sPK and ePK, respectively. All protocols are eCK secure except for HMQV, which is a modification of MQV [13] . It is secure in a modified CK [8] model and has additional security properties like resistance to KCI attack, wPFS, and resistance to LEP under GDH and knowledge of exponent assumptions (KEA1) [3] .
When comparing computational efficiency, we do not take into account publickey validation, which is a necessary procedure to prevent potential leakage of private information similar to invalid-curve attacks [1] and small subgroup attacks [14] ; see also [19, 21] . Okamoto's protocol is secure in the standard model, but the proof depends on a rather strong assumption of the existence of πPRF family. In the security proof of HMQV and CMQV, the reduction argument is less tight since the Forking Lemma [24] is essential for the arguments. In comparison, the rest of the protocols in Table 1 , including Protocol 1 and Protocol 2, have tighter security reductions and do not use the Forking Lemma.
No NAXOS' approach. As shown in Table 1 , Protocol 1 has the same characteristic as NETS and Protocol 2 has the same characteristic as NAXOS+ in computation efficiency, security model, and underlying assumption. The difference is that our protocols dispenses with NAXOS' approach, at the expense of an additional group element in the static key. SMEN − also has features similar to Protocol 1: it is eCK-secure in the random oracle model under the GDH assumption, does not use NAXOS' approach and a static public key is a pair of group elements. It achieves better computational performance (2.46 vs 3 exponentiations), but requires that the an ephemeral key constitutes of two group elements. Therefore it provides a trade-off between computation and communication efficiencies.
We showed that it is possible to construct eCK-secure AKE protocols without using NAXOS' approach, so our protocols are secure even when the discrete logarithm of the ephemeral public key is revealed. As pointed out in [26] , protocols that do not rely on NAXOS' approach decrease the risk of leaking the static private key in comparison with protocols that ustilize the NAXOS' approach. This feature makes protocols like ours, SMEN − and HMQV more practical. Another advantage of our protocols is the use of single random oracle as opposed to two for HMQV and CMQV. The random oracle is needed for the session key derivation, which is typical way to attain indistinguishability in random oracle model. As pointed in [7] , although protocols secure in the random oracle model produce assurance for the scheme's correctness, there may remain some fear since concrete hash function instantiations differ from a truly random function. In the sense of minimal reliance on random oracles, our protocols and SMEN − are the best among protocols in Table 1 .
Conclusion
The extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) definition introduced by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin is a strong security model for authenticated key exchange. This paper presented two eCK-secure AKE protocols without using NAXOS' approach. As a result, our protocols provide strong security assurances without compromising too much on efficiency. In addition, we minimized the reliance on the random oracle for the security argument and were able to utilize the trap-door test to assume only computational assumptions.
